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Abstract
Data integration and sharing maximally enhance the potential for novel and mean-
ingful discoveries. However, it is a non-trivial task as integrating data from multiple
sources can put sensitive information of study participants at risk. To address
the privacy concern, we present a distributed Bayesian learning approach via
Preconditioned Stochastic Gradient Langevin Dynamics with RMSprop, which
combines differential privacy and homomorphic encryption in a harmonious man-
ner while protecting private information. We applied the proposed secure and
privacy-preserving distributed Bayesian learning approach to logistic regression
and survival analysis on distributed data, and demonstrated its feasibility in terms
of prediction accuracy and time complexity, compared to the centralized approach.
1 Introduction
In the past few decades, machine learning has shown significant success in a wide variety of real-
world applications. In particular, distributed learning has shown its potential to effectively leverage
decentralized data to collaboratively train machine learning models. However, it might put sensitive
information at risk as the training process involves intermediary parameter exchange, which might
be used by adversaries to conduct inference attacks to reconstruct training samples or infer the
membership [1, 2].
Several cryptography technologies have been recently developed to support privacy-preserving
computation on distributed data. Among these solutions, differential privacy (DP) is a cryptography-
motivated privacy protection mechanism to protect private information through random perturbation
in general learning procedures such as machine learning algorithms [3, 4]. However, its strictness
to guarantee a strong privacy applies to the output of the algorithm, which might introduce too
much noise in cases where the transfer or exchange of intermediate statistics (including the output),
such as distributed learning, is required. Recently, homomorphic encryption (HE) has shed light
on privacy-preserving distributed learning challenges, which allows encrypted data to be computed
without having access to raw data [5]. However, HE is computationally intensive, especially when the
evaluation of a deep circuit is needed since multiplication operations bring about increased noise level
or decreased ciphertext modulus. When HE is combined with DP, it generates a positive synergistic
effect: (1) reduced DP noise due to the protection of intermediary statistics and (2) minimized HE
computation thanks to the privacy protection of DP. Although such studies have been successfully
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conducted on generalized linear models using a combination of DP and HE [6, 7], this framework
does not directly apply to Bayesian ones.
Bayesian models have become recognized as one of the powerful machine learning techniques due
to their ability to leverage prior information provided by domain experts and statistical evidence
from data (i.e., confidence estimation) and to avoid overfitting. Despite the advantages of Bayesian
methods, they have one important disadvantage - high computational complexity. One remarkable
recent approach to resolve the computational challenges of Bayesian learning is to combine stochastic
gradient descent (SGD) [8] and Monte Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods [9]. When an appro-
priate sequence of step sizes is given, it has been shown to converge to the true posterior based on
the gradient on a minibatch of data in several variants [10–12]. In this paper, we will focus on the
pioneering and the most common algorithm, Stochastic Gradient Langevin Dynamics (SGLD) [13].
More specifically, the preconditioned version of SGLD by RMSprop, developed to increase the
efficiency of the standard SGLD [13, 14], is our interest. There has also been work on differentially
private SGLD [15, 16], but no work for the preconditioned SGLD.
There are other approaches for privacy-preserving distributed Bayesian learning which combine DP
and multi-party computation (MPC). Heikkilä et al. [17] proposed the hybrid system that allows data
owners to secretly share data with several independent servers and the servers to securely compute
the required sums of sufficient statistics of Bayesian learning. So, if taking into account Bayesian
learning which needs different types of computation (e.g. multiplication), their approach may require
additional computational cost and communication between servers.
In this paper, we introduce a general framework that combines the strength of DP and HE in order to
support adaptive and efficient optimizers for Bayesian learning. Our approach not only protects the
training data during the learning process using HE, but also preserves the privacy of the resulting
model via DP. We show that under standard assumptions, the Preconditioned SGLD (pSGLD)
algorithm with the RMSprop preconditioner is differentially private. We present an efficient method
to securely train Bayesian learning models in a distributed setting. We make use of the diagonal
preconditioner to exploit parallel computation over packed ciphertexts. As a result, it requires one
HE computation protocol execution per iteration but with a trivial per-iteration overhead in terms
of computation and communication. Finally, we conduct extensive empirical evaluation to show its
scalability on real data. We apply the proposed secure and privacy-preserving distributed Bayesian
learning approach to logistic regression and survival analysis on distributed data, and demonstrate its
feasibility in terms of prediction accuracy and time complexity, compared to the centralized approach.
The results have demonstrated that our approach (when applied on distributed data) can produce
secure and privacy-preserving predictive models with: (1) good accuracy comparable to the global
model trained on centralized data and (2) high-efficiency thanks to the synergistic combination of
DP and HE. Our novel method enjoys “privacy for free in a distributed scenario" because of the
HE protection of intermediary statistics, while the theoretical support of DP’s privacy guarantee on
parameters allows the construction of a very shallow circuit even for the iterative learning algorithm.
Consequently, it enables us to avoid an expensive bootstrapping procedure that refreshes low-level
ciphertexts (e.g. Cheon et al. [18]), and so our proposed approach is computationally tractable
compared to HE-based solutions.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Differential Privacy
DP is one of the strongest privacy-preserving criteria to provide quantitative privacy guarantees based
on a probabilistic formulation without any assumption about adversary.
Definition 1 ((, δ)-Differential Privacy [3]). Given a pair of data sets D and D′ differing by at
most one record (i.e., |D∆D′| ≤ 1), a randomized algorithm Ag satisfies (, δ)-DP if and for all
S ⊆ Range(Ag), we have Pr[Ag(D) ∈ S] ≤ e · Pr[Ag(D′) ∈ S] + δ, where the probabilities are
over the randomness of the algorithm Ag. The privacy parameters  and δ are positive numbers,
for which small numbers correspond to stronger protection and vice versa. When δ = 0, Ag is
-differentially private.
Any adversaries cannot distinguish the output fromD orD′ as long as  and δ are small enough. Thus,
any record that makes the difference between D and D′ is protected, and therefore, providing an ad
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omnia protection to the entire dataset. Adding controlled noise from predetermined distributions
is a way of designing DP mechanisms. Commonly used distributions are Laplace and Gaussian
distributions. With the Gaussian mechanism that adds Gaussian noise, the noise is usually calibrated
to the `2 sensitivity.
Definition 2 (`2 Sensitivity [3]). For any function f : D → Rd, the sensitivity of f is defined as
∆2f = supD,D′‖f(D)− f(D′)‖2, for all D and D′.
Theorem 1 (Gaussian Mechanism [19]). Given any function f : D → Rd, the Gaussian Mechanism
is defined as fˆ(X) = f(X) +N (0, σ2I). For arbitrary , δ ∈ (0, 1), the Gaussian Mechanism is
(, δ)-differential private if σ ≥ ∆2f(
√
2 log(1.25/δ)/).
DP also has a favorable property such as composability. The composition of k differentially pri-
vate mechanisms, where the i-th mechanism is (i, δi)-differentially private, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, is
(
∑
i i,
∑
i δi)-differentially private. Better results for (, δ)-differential privacy will follow from
using the advanced composition theorem.
Theorem 2 (Advanced Composition [20]). For every  > 0, δ, δ′ > 0, k ∈ N, and (, δ)-differentially
private algorithms Ag1,Ag2, ...,Agk, the composition (Ag1,Ag2, ...,Agk) satisfies (g, kδ + δ
′)-
differential privacy for g =
√
2k log(1/δ′)+ k(e − 1).
2.2 Homomorphic Encryption
HE allows one to perform arithmetic operations on encrypted data and receive an encrypted result
corresponding to the result of operations performed in plaintext. This technology has great potential in
many real-world applications such as statistical testing, neural networks, and other machine learning
models [21–25]. Among the state-of-the-art HE cryptosystems, the CKKS scheme [26] is capable of
performing approximate computation on encrypted data, so it has shown remarkable performance
advantages in real-world applications that do not require absolute precision, which is the case for
many machine learning models [27, 28, 23].
A key feature of the CKKS scheme is to use a built-in rescaling operation on encrypted data as if
rounding off significant digits in plain fixed-point computation. This technique leads to precision
adjustment to get rid of accumulated extra digits after homomorphic computation and therefore
enables to control the magnitude (size) of messages. We multiply a scale factor of ∆ to plaintexts
and convert them into the nearest integers before encryption in order to minimize the accuracy loss
during computation. It is a common practice to perform the rescaling procedure by a factor of ∆ on
ciphertexts after each multiplication to maintain the precision of the plaintext. Also, one can encrypt
multiple plaintext values into a single packed ciphertext to perform parallel homomorphic operations
in a single instruction multiple data (SIMD) manner. To be precise, the CKKS scheme provides an
encryption function Enc(·) and a decryption function Dec(·) such that for x, y ∈ Rn/2,
Dec(Enc(x) + Enc(y)) ≈ x⊕ y, Dec(Enc(x) · Enc(y)) ≈ x y,
where n is defined as a power-of-two integer for an underlying cyclotomic ring dimension, and ⊕
and  denote the element-wise addition and multiplication over real numbers.
2.3 Preconditioned Stochastic Gradient Langevin Dynamics
The vanilla SGLD is composed of characteristics from SGD and Langevin dynamics, a math-
ematical extension of molecular dynamics models. Given data D = {xi ∈ Rp}Ni=1, the
posterior of model parameters θ with prior p(θ) and likelihood
∏N
i=1 p(xi|θ) is computed as
p(θ|D) ∝ p(θ)∏Ni=1 p(xi|θ). The parameter update is computed as:
∆θt = −ηt
2
(
∇θ log p(θt) + N
τ
τ∑
i=1
∇θ log p(xti |θt)
)
+ zt,
where ηt is a sequence of step sizes and zt ∼ N (0, ηtI) with I denoting the identity matrix. This
update function is based on a perturbed version of the negative log-posterior objective function on the
SGD with a mini-batch size τ . SGLD incorporates uncertainty into estimates to avoid converging to
the maximum a posterior point estimate.
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To increase the efficiency of the standard SGLD [13], which updates with the same step size, an
improved solution is to employ preconditioning G(θ) that aims to constitute a local transform such
that the rate of curvature of the gradients is equal in all directions:
θt+1 = θt − ηt
2
[
G(θt)
(
∇θ log p(θt) +N
τ
τ∑
i=1
∇θ log p(xti |θt)
)
+ Γ(θt)
]
+ zt,
where zt ∼ N (0, ηtG(θt)) and Γ(θ) =
∑
j
∂Gi,j(θ)
∂θj
. Among many preconditioners, Adagrad [29],
Adam [30], and RMSprop [31] are popular choices due to their simplicity and wide applicability.
3 Proposed Approach
3.1 Privacy Analysis for Preconditioned Stochastic Gradient Langevin Dynamics with
RMSprop
This study specifies the use of RMSprop preconditioner:
V (θt) = αV (θt−1) + (1− α)g¯(θt;Dt) g¯(θt;Dt),
G(θt) = diag(1 (λ1 +
√
V (θt)),
where α ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that adjusts the balance between historical and current gradients and
λ ∈ R+ is a curvature controlling parameter which is usually a small value. Here,  and  operators
represent element-wise matrix product and division, respectively. Since this preconditioner is updated
sequentially using only the current gradient information, and only estimates a diagonal matrix, we
can efficiently incorporate it with HE by utilizing SIMD based operations. In fact, Li et al. [14] has
shown the finite-time convergence properties of pSGLD using the RMSprop preconditioner.
This section gives differential privacy analysis of pSGLD with RMSprop. We note that the pioneering
and recognized work [15] already gave similar theoretical results on SGLD and we extend the theory
to consider the use of preconditioner G(θ). Based on the Gaussian mechanism, they showed that
SGLD is (, δ)-differentially private for free if the step size ηt is chosen appropriately (i.e., ηt <
2N
128L2 log(2.5T/δ) log(2/δ)t in their study).
Theorem 3 (Differentially Private Preconditioned Stochastic Gradient Langevin Dynamics with
RMSprop). Assume initial θ1 is chosen independent of the data, also assume p(x|θ) is L-smooth
in || · ||2 for any x ∈ X and θ ∈ Θ. In addition, let , δ, τ, T be chosen such that T ≥ 2N32τ log(2/δ) .
Then Algorithm 1 preserves (, δ)-differential privacy.
Proof. In every iteration, the only data access is g¯(θt;Dt) and by the L-Lipschitz condition, the
sensitivity of g¯(θt;Dt) is at most 2L and G(θt) is at least ( 1λ+L )I. Given G(θt) = diag(1 (λ1 +√
V (θt)), we have
V (θt) =
t∑
i=1
(αt−i · (1− α)) · (g¯(θt;Dt) g¯(θt;Dt))
≤ (1− α)(L1 L1)
t∑
i=1
αi−1 ≤ (1− α)(L1 L1)
∞∑
i=1
αi−1
≤ (1− α)(L1 L1)
(
1
1− α
)
= (L1 L1).
Since ( 1
λ+
√
L·L )I = (
1
λ+L )I ≤ G(θt) ≤ 1λ I, we have λI ≤ diag(1G(θt)) ≤ (λ+L)I. Note that
diag(1G(θt)) is just an inverse of G(θt). The rest part remains the same as in Wang et al. [15],
except for removing the N
2η2tG
2(θt)
4τ2 factor from the variance σ
2I in the algorithm and Gaussian
mechanism in order to get the essential noise that is added to g¯(θt;Dt).
The proof includes the Lipshitz condition denoted by L, which is a general assumption of differential
privacy on loss functions to control the impact of single data point change to the output of the
algorithm [32, 33, 15].
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Remark 1. The algorithm can privately release the entire sequence of parameter updates since it
ensures differential privacy at each iteration.
Our differentially private pSGLD with RMSprop is described in Algorithm 1 and we will extend it to
be secure in a distributed setting via HE.
Algorithm 1 Differentially Private Preconditioned Stochastic Gradient Langevin Dynamics with
RMSprop (DP-pSGLD with RMSprop)
Input: Data D, τ, T, γ ∈ (0, 1), RMSprop parameters λ, α, privacy parameters , δ, Lipschitz
constant L
Output: {θt}t=1:T
Initialize V 0 ← 0, random θ1
for t = 1 to bNT/τc do
Sample a mini-batch of size τ,Dt = {xt1 , ...,xtτ }
Estimate g¯(θt;Dt) = 1τ
∑τ
i=1∇ log p(xti |θt)
V (θt)← αV (θt−1) + (1− α)g¯(θt;Dt) g¯(θt;Dt)
G(θt)← diag(1 (λ1 +
√
V (θt))
ηt ← γ
2(λ+L)τ
32L2N log ( 2.5NTτδ ) log (
2
δ )t
θt+1 ← θt − ηt2
[
G(θt)
(∇θ log p(θt) +Ng¯(θt;Dt))+ Γ(θt)]+N (0, ηtG(θt))
end for
Remark 2. The only intermediary statistics required for running this algorithm, which is a
gradient, can be linearly decomposed and locally calculated at individual sites: g¯(θt;Dt) =
1
K
∑K
k=1 g¯k(θt;Dkt ), where K is the number of local sites, Dk = {xki } represents local data of the
k-th site, Dkt = {xkti} is a subset of (τ/K) data items randomly chosen from Dk at iteration t, and
g¯k(θt;Dkt ) = Kτ
∑τ/K
i=1 ∇ log p(xkti |θt) when τ is assumed to be divided equally across K sites.
3.2 Secure and Differentially Private Distributed Bayesian Learning
In this section, we aim to explore the pSGLD algorithm with RMSprop on distributed data in a secure
and privacy-preserving manner. We present a method to update parameters from homomorphically
encrypted intermediate information while decrypting the model estimators at each iteration. In our
protocol, there are three parties: a cryptographic service provider (CSP), collaborative sites (data
providers), and a cloud server. The CSP is a legitimate owner of cryptographic keys that are used
for encryption (pk), decryption (sk), and homomorphic computation (evk). At the beginning of the
protocol, the CSP generates the key trio (sk, pk, evk). The collaborative sites use the public key to
encrypt their data before outsourcing and then send encrypted data to the cloud services. The cloud
server has only access to the evaluation key for homomorphic computation and performs a certain
analysis without decrypting data. Our protocol consists of two phases of computation: (1) a one-time
preparation phase of standardizing the data matrix; (2) an iterative estimation phase of the model
parameters.
3.2.1 Precomputation Phase
In this phase, the data matrix is first normalized by subtracting the mean from each column and
dividing each column by the standard deviation. Then it is divided by a quantity proportional to
the maximum between its `2 norm. Each local site encrypts their local sample size nk and local
mean x¯k = 1nk
∑
xki . Then the server securely aggregates the encrypted local information across
institutions. The resulting ciphertexts are decrypted with the secret key of the CSP. It follows from
the homomorphic properties of the CKKS scheme that each ciphertext represents an approximate
value to the desired result. Later, the CSP disseminates the global sample size N and the sample sum
s. Using the global information, the sample mean x¯ can be easily computed as s/N . Similarly, each
site can get the desired standard deviation and global maximum by the aid of the CSP. We adopt a
random masking technique to obscure the inputs while computing their maximum, suggested in [7].
We refer to Appendix A for an explicit description.
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3.2.2 Iterative Model Estimation Phase
At each iteration, the server securely aggregates the local gradients over encryption and updates the
parameters while adding the Gaussian noise inside the secure computation. As noted in Remark 1,
our pSGLD algorithm guarantees differential privacy of intermediate model estimators, so it allows
us to decrypt and use them as fresh inputs for the subsequent iteration.
Gradient estimation. As mentioned in Remark 2, the gradient can be locally calculated at indi-
vidual sites. At each iteration, each site sends an encryption of the local gradient to the server. For
notational simplicity, we let g¯kt = g¯k(θt;Dkt ) be the local gradient of the k-th site at iteration t
and denote its encrypted gradient by Enc(g¯kt ). The server aggregates the ciphertexts over encryp-
tion, yielding a ciphertext ctgt which encrypts a plaintext approximating to the global gradient
g¯t = g¯(θt;Dt). Here, we delay a division operation by K for the sake of optimization, so we have
Dec(ctgt) ≈ K · (∆g¯t).
Gradient variance. The gradients are updated recursively by adding a fraction α of the update
vector of the past time to the current update. This implies that at each iteration we should perform
the rescaling operation right after a scalar multiplication. We note that the rescaling operation in the
CKKS scheme divides an input ciphertext by a factor of ∆ and a ciphertext modulus finally becomes
too small to carry out further computation. To address this problem, we express the recursive update
of V (θt) as a weighted sum of the previous data:
V (θt)=
t∑
i=1
(αt−i · (1− α)) · (g¯i  g¯i) . (1)
Since the gradients are given as freshly encrypted ciphertexts (i.e., they are with respect to the
largest modulus), it is enough to cope with a few levels of computation, thereby achieving a better
performance. To be precise, suppose that at time t we have encryptions of (g¯i  g¯i) for 1 ≤ i < t. A
naive solution for computing V (θt) is to encrypt each d-dimensional vector g¯kt as a single ciphertext
in a way that each entry is aligned with the vectors at the previous steps, and to evaluate the Eq. (1)
by using the pure SIMD operations (addition and multiplication) on encrypted vectors without any
interaction between the slots. In this case, we need a single multiplication and t scalar multiplication
for the evaluation. We observe that a ciphertext can hold (n/2) different plaintext slots for a large
ring dimension n, and hence we can compute r = (n/2d) scalar operations in parallel. This implies
that the local gradient information of r many different iterations can be packed into a single ciphertext
without overlapping. That is, for some t ≤ r, each term of Eq. (1) is sequentially encrypted as a
single ciphertext, and we finally add up all the resulting vectors by adding the output ciphertext to
its rotations recursively. As a result, this method can be computed using a single multiplication,
scalar multiplication, and log t rotations. In general, it only takes a single multiplication, dt/re scalar
multiplications and min{log r, log t} rotations. Let ctV denote the output ciphertext.
Remark 3. We remark that for any α ∈ [0, 1), the value αp goes to zero as p increases. We may
assume that the value of αp · (1−α) is negligible for a sufficiently large p. Despite α ∼ 1, we observe
that αp · (1−α) < 10−11 when α = 0.9 and p > 218. In practice, this gives us an approximation of
the values V (θt) by computing 219 terms before from the current point t:
V (θt) ≈
t∑
i=t−218
(αt−i · (1− α)) · (g¯i  g¯i) .
RMSprop preconditioner. Existing HE schemes only allow the evaluation of polynomial functions,
so the Taylor approximation is commonly used for approximation of analytic function. However,
it is a local approximation near a certain point, we should use a high degree Taylor polynomial to
guarantee accuracy. There is a global approximation method that minimizes the mean squared error
proposed by Kim et al. [27], but the Chebyshev approximation is more accurate and numerically
stable than this. Therefore we adopt the Chebyshev approximation of 1/(λ+
√
x) for λ ∈ R.
Recall that the Chebyshev polynomials are defined by the recurrence relation Tj+1(x) = 2x ·Tj(x)−
Tj−1(x) with T0(x) = 1 and T1(x) = x. Note that these polynomials form an orthogonal basis over
the interval [−1, 1]. It can be generalized to [a, b] by defining T˜j(x) = Tj((2x− (b+a))/(b−a)) for
x ∈ [a, b]. Then 1/(λ+√x) can be approximated by a truncated Chebyshev series (c0/2) +
∑
j cj ·
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Algorithm 2 Iterative Estimation
Input: τ, T, γ ∈ (0, 1), λ, α, , δ, L, {aj}
Output: {θt}t=1:T
Initialize random θ1
for t = 1 to T do
[At local sites]:
for k = 1 to K do
Compute local gradient, encrypt, and transmit Enc(g¯kt ) to the server
end for
[At the cloud server]:
ctgt ←
∑K
k=1 Enc(g¯
k
t )
ctV ←
∑t
i=t−218(α
t−i · (1− α)) · (ctgi · ctgi)
ctG ←
∑
j
aj
K2j · (ctV )j
ηt ← γ
2(λ+L)τ
32L2N log ( 2.5NTτδ ) log (
2
δ )t
η′t ←
√
(λ+ L)ηt
ctθt+1 ← θt −
[
ηt
2 (∇θ log p(θt) + NK · ctgt)− η′tN (0, I)
] · ctG
[At the CSP]:
θt+1 ← Dec(ctθt+1)
Send θt+1 back to the server
[At the cloud server]:
Disseminate θt+1 to each local site
end for
T˜j(x). In order to evaluate the polynomial efficiently, we express the approximation polynomial in
standard form of
∑
j ajx
j . We observe that the plaintext of the input ciphertext ctV is scaled by a
factor of K2, so we re-write it into the form
∑
j(aj/K
2j) · (K2 · x)j . Consequently, we can get an
encryption of G(θt) by evaluating
∑
j(aj/K
2j) · (ctV )j , say the resulting ciphertext ctG.
Remark 4. In practice, it is a good option to adjust the gradient g¯kt so that it is close to Lipschitz
L as g˜kt = c · g¯kt with an auxiliary constant c and limited to 10−3 (i.e., g˜kt = max (g˜kt , 10−3)) for
learning and stability of the approximation. As long as the adjusted gradient g˜t does not exceed
Lipschitz L, Algorithm 1 still satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy.
Parameter update. In the end, the server updates the model parameters by computing the changes
in the parameters as follows:
∆θt = −ηt
2
G(θt)(∇θ log p(θt) +Ng¯(θt;Dt)) + η′tG(θt)z,
where z ∼ N (0, I) and η′t =
√
(λ+ L)ηt. For simplicity of the algorithm, we assume that local
sites can share their prior beliefs on the parameters with no loss of privacy and utilize the same local
mini-batch size. As noted above, since we did not divide the encryption of the global gradient by
K, the server multiplies the ciphertext ctgt by
ηtN
2K . The resulting ciphertext is added by a constant
(ηt2 ∇θ log p(θt)− η′tz) since∇θ log p(θt) is a function of disclosable θt, and then multiplied by the
ciphertext ctG. The server finally updates the model parameters θt using the encrypted change and
sends the encrypted updated model estimator ctθt+1 to the CSP. After it is decrypted with the secret
key of the CSP, it is sent back to the server while ensuring its privacy via DP.
3.2.3 Threat Model
Firstly, we assume that the cloud server is semi-honest (i.e., honest but curious). If we ensure the
semantic security of the underlying HE scheme, all the computations on the server are processed in
encrypted form, so the server learns nothing from the encrypted data. Secondly, we assume that the
CSP is not allowed to collude with the server or each site. The CSP should not be given access to
data that are not part of the query from the server. Lastly, we assume that the local sites should not
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collude. That is, their local information (e.g. local sample size, mean, or variance) is not disclosed to
the other local parties even though the global information is given to all the local sites.
4 Experiments
In this section, we explain how to select the HE parameters and demonstrate the applicability of the
proposed method on a few models.
4.1 HE Parameter Selection
We employ the Residue Number System (RNS) variant of the CKKS scheme [34, 35]. Our source
code is developed in C++ with Microsoft SEAL version 3.4 [36]. A freshly encrypted ciphertext of
the CKKS scheme is represented as a pair of polynomials in the ring ZQ[x]/(xn + 1) where Q is
set as a product of (` + 1) pairwise co-primes qi (i.e., Q =
∏`
i=0 qi). The primes qi’s are chosen
to have roughly the same size as the scaling factor ∆. As noted before, we perform the rescaling
operation after each multiplication, so a ciphertext at the level i is scaled down by a factor of qi and
the underlying plaintext is also approximately reduced by the same factor. As a result, it turns out
that the largest ciphertext modulus size is determined by the multiplicative depth of a circuit to be
evaluated. In our protocol, it requires ` = 3 + d(log(d′ + 1)e where d′ denotes the degree of an
approximation polynomial of 1/(λ+
√
x). For λ = 10−4, we used the Chebyshev approximation
of degree 7 over the interval [10−3, 1], and we therefore deduce ` = 6. The scaling factor is set
to ∆ = 245 (≈ log qi) and the bit-size of the largest modulus is set to logPQ = 380 where P is
a special modulus to reduce the noise growth during homomorphic operations. We take the ring
dimension n = 214 to ensure 128 bits of security against the known attacks on the LWE problem [37].
Details are given in Appendix B.
4.2 Experimental Results
We demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed approach via several experiments on Bayesian density
estimation with simple simulation, Bayesian logistic regression, and Bayesian survival analysis. In
each experiment, we compare the results of models in three different settings: (1) global model
without DP and HE on centralized data, (2) global model with DP on centralized data, and (3)
federated model with DP and HE on distributed data. We note that the purpose of this experiment is to
compare methods on the same model architecture but different settings. The performance of the first
model is a reference value. We randomly selected 80% of data for training and 20% of data for testing
and repeated ten times; their averaged results are presented. The prior is set to p(θ) = N (0, σ2I), and
λ = 10−4, α = 0.9, γ = 0.99, L = 1 for simplicity. The privacy budget δ is is set 10−5. The step
sizes for the global model with no DP and HE are determined by ηt = 1.65× 10−2/t in favor of it.
As mentioned earlier, the batch size of τ at each iteration is defined by the value in the global setting
(i.e., a local batch size is τ/K for the K-site distributed scenario). More intensive experimental
results for various priors and local sample sizes are provided in Appendix C. Our experiments were
conducted on a machine with Intel Xeon at 3.0 GHz with a single-thread environment, compiled with
GNU C++ 7.4.0 using the ‘-O2’ optimization setting.
4.2.1 Bayesian density estimation with simple simulation
We implemented our approach on two-dimensional simple example data involving two parameters
for the mean: X1 ∼ N (θ1, 0.1);X2 ∼ N (θ2, 0.1) where θ1 ∼ N (0, σ2); θ2 ∼ N (0, σ2). 10,000
data points were drawn from the model with θ1 = 0.5, θ2 = −0.5, and σ2 = 1. The number of sites
for distributed learning is set to 2 with an equal sample size. Under a minibatch size of 1000 and
T = 100, we compared the results of three different models when  = 1. Figure 1 shows that the
difference between the estimate from the three different models and the true value. The estimates
from our approach seem to fluctuate but these are accurate as much as ones from the global model
with and without DP on centralized data. This means the proposed approach enables us to learn
Bayesian learning with no significant loss.
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(a) Learning curves for θ1 (b) Learning curves for θ2
Figure 1: Bayesian density estimation when  = 1 on the artificial dataset: 2 features, 10,000 data
points.
(a) Learning curves when  = 1 (b) Classification accuracies
Figure 2: Bayesian logistic regression on the PhysioNet dataset: 184 features, 4,000 data points.
4.2.2 Bayesian Logistic Regression
We applied our approach to a Bayesian logistic regression model. We used the PhysioNet Challenge
2012 dataset [38] for binary classification to predict mortality, after pre-processing of the data. A
Gaussian prior for each β was used with the mean 0 and variance 1. Under T = 500, a batch size of
320 at each iteration is set for both 2 and 5-site distributed scenarios. The privacy budget  is changed
from -2 to 1 in the log-scale. The results in Figure 2 show that our approach can achieve the prediction
accuracy as much as the global model with DP, which means our approach is empirically workable
without any prediction accuracy loss resulting from HE and a distributed setting. However, due to
the constraint on the learning rate of DP versions, the global model with DP including our approach
cannot reach a good point with a small . Nevertheless, the encouraging point is that prediction
accuracy approaches to one of the global model without any DP and HE as  increases.
4.2.3 Bayesian Survival Analysis
Survival analysis is a class of statistical methods to study the time until the occurrence of a specified
event. Among several models to conduct survival analysis, we focus on the Exponential distribution-
based parametric survival model. The same hyper-parameter setting as logistic regression was applied
here. We used the FLchain dataset to predict the mortality based on the association of the serum-free
light chain [39, 40]. It is observed from the results shown in Figure 3 that the trends in prediction
performance remain similar to those in logistic regression.
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(a) Learning curves when  = 1 (b) Classification accuracies
Figure 3: Bayesian survival analysis on the FLchain dataset: 7 features, 7,874 data points.
Table 1: Time complexity analysis. Let T ′ = bNT/τc. Numbers are in seconds (sec) or minutes
(min). We denote by d and r = 8192/d the number of features and the maximal number of
d-dimensional vectors which are capable of being encrypted in a single ciphertext, respectively.
Task Number Number Precomputation Iterative model estimation
of sites of iters Local Server CSP Local Server CSP
Theoretical
K T 4KEnc
KHM 1Enc
KT ′Enc
(
T ′ · (8 + d 219r e)
)
SM+
T ′DecComplexity +(K + 1)SM +(K + 4)Dec (9T ′)HM+(
T ′ ·min{dlog te,8, dlog re})Rot
Density
2 100 0.05 sec 0.04 sec 0.09 sec 34.4 sec 4.2 min 1.0 sec
estimation
Logistic 2
500
0.07 sec 0.2 sec 0.4 sec 7.0 min 34.1 min 9.4 sec
regression 5 0.1 sec 0.4 sec 0.2 sec 15.6 min 36.5 min 10.4 sec
Survival 2
500
0.07 sec 0.2 sec 0.1 sec 14.2 min 67.1 min 17.3 sec
analysis 5 0.09 sec 0.4 sec 0.1 sec 28.6 min 69.7 min 17.7 sec
We stress that this can be easily generalized to other parametric survival models such as Weibull and
Gompertz as well as Cox proportional hazard model that is a semi-parametric model [41].
4.2.4 Performance Analysis
In Table 1, we provide theoretical time complexity and experimental timing results for the aforemen-
tioned tasks. Here, let HM denote the homomorphic multiplication, SM the scalar multiplication, and
Rot the rotation operation on the encrypted vector. For the HE parameter setting, the key generation
takes around 3.2 seconds. At the pre-processing phase, the complexity of all the parties is linear in
the number of local sites K. We notice that it is independent of the number of features since the use
of the SIMD technique allows one to perform homomorphic computation in parallel. On the other
hand, at the model parameter estimation phase, all the parties achieve a linear time complexity in the
number of iterations T .
We remark that the numbers in local sites are the total running time but it might not depend on the
number of participating institutions because such computation can be executed in a synchronous
way. We see that in several models the prediction accuracy reaches a good point in a reasonable time,
demonstrating the feasibility of our approach.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents the first work to combine DP and HE for a popular Bayesian optimization
framework pSGLD in a distributed setting. We demonstrated its applicability to the generalized linear
model (e.g. logistic regression) and the time-to-event model (e.g. survival models). It can be further
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extended to Bayesian deep learning models to address the dilemma of privacy and utility, closing
the technology gap in data scarcity and model generalizability. We provide privacy and security
analysis with provable guarantees to this optimization strategy. This might address a lot of challenges
in healthcare, education, and finance disciplines, in which data are highly confidential and hard to
acquire from distributed owners.
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A Algorithm Details of Precomputation
A.1 Standardization
Algorithm 3 provides the detail about our secure protocol for data standardization. In this protocol,
the data matrix is securely normalized by subtracting the mean from each column and dividing each
column by the standard deviation.
Suppose that Dk = {xki }1≤i≤nk represents local data of the k-th site. Each local site encrypts their
local sample size nk and local mean x¯k = 1nk
∑
xki , and sends the encryptions to the server. Next,
the server securely aggregates the encrypted local information across institutions. After that, the
resulting ciphertexts are decrypted with the secret key of the CSP. In particular, the global sample size
N is an integer, so if we take a sufficiently large scale factor of ∆, the decryption result is very close
to N and we can get the exact N by computing the nearest integer of the decryption result. Later
on, the CSP disseminates the global sample size N and sample sum s to the local sites. Using these
global information, the sample mean x¯ can be easily computed as s/N .
Similarly, each sites can get the desired standard deviation by the aid of the CSP. Specifically, the
local sites encrypt the squared differences between their data and the global mean with divided by the
global sample size N . The server performs simple homomorphic additions of the encrypted variances
from the sites. After that, the CSP decrypts the resulting ciphertext and each sites can get the desired
global variance. In the end, the local data is mean-centered by subtracting the global mean from each
column and divided by the standard deviation.
A.2 Normalization
Algorithm 4 provides an explicit description of our secure protocol for data normalization. In this
protocol, the data is securely divided by a quantity proportional to the maximum between its `2
norm. This protocol is similar to [7], but is generalized to compute the maximum between multiple
encrypted values.
After the standardization process, each local site encrypts the maximum between the `2 norm of their
local data and transmits it to the server. To be precise, the k-th local maximum mk can be computed
by mk = max{||xki ||2}1≤i≤nk . In the following, the server and CPS engage in computation to
obtain an encryption of the global maximum. The server first generates two positive random numbers
r1 ← Zt1 , r2 ← Zt2 for some t1, t2 (which will be determined later), and obtainsK many ciphertexts
by computing ct′k = (ctk + r1) · r2, where ctk is a ciphertext of mk scaled by a factor of ∆. Next, the
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Algorithm 3 Precomputation Phase - Standardization
[At local sites]:
for k = 1 to K do
x¯k← 1nk
∑nk
i=1 x
k
i B local mean
Send Enc(nk) and Enc(x¯k) to the server
end for
[At the cloud server]:
ctsample ←
∑
k Enc(nk)
ctsum ←
∑
k(Enc(nk) · Enc(x¯k))
Send ctsample and ctsum to the CSP
[At the CSP]:
N ← bDec(ctsample)e B global sample size
s← Dec(ctsum) B scaled global mean
Disseminate N and s to each local site
[At local sites]:
for k = 1 to K do
x¯← s/N B global mean
Sk← 1N
∑nk
i=1(x
k
i − x¯)2
Send Enc(Sk) to the server
end for
[At the cloud server]:
ctvar ←
∑
k Enc(Sk)
Send ctvar to the CSP
[At the CSP]:
S ← Dec(ctvar) B global variance
Disseminate S to each local site
[At local sites]:
for k = 1 to K do
for i = 1 to nk do
xki ← (xki − x¯)/
√
S
end for
end for
server re-arranges the output ciphertexts and sends them to the CSP, so that the CSP does not know
which local sites has the maximum. Suppose that i1, i2, . . . , iK are distinct elements of {1, 2, . . . ,K}.
Then each ciphertext ctik is decrypted as the value Mik , which is approximate to (∆mik + r1) · r2.
If assuming that ∆mik is less than t1 and t1, t2 are co-prime, any element Mik is statistically close
to uniform in Zt1·t2 . Hence, the CSP learns nothing else after decryption while computing the
randomized maximum value between them, say M = max{Mik}1≤k≤K . Later on, an encryption of
this value M is sent to the server. Afterwards, the server multiplies this ciphertext by r−12 and subtracts
r1, yielding a ciphertext which represents the desired constant m = max{||xki ||2}1≤k<K,1≤i≤nk
since
r−12 · Enc(M)− r1 ≈ Enc
(
r−12 M− r1
) ≈ Enc (r−12 · (∆m + r1) · r2 − r1) ≈ Enc(∆m).
Finally, the server sends the output ciphertext to the CSP and its decrypted result is disseminated to
each site.
B HE Parameter Setting
Our underlying HE scheme is based on the Ring Learning with Error (RLWE) assumption over the
cyclotomic ringR = Z[x]/(xn + 1) for a power-of-two integer n. Let us denote by [·]q the reduction
modulo q into the interval (−q/2, q/2] ∩ Z of the integer. We writeRq = R/qR for the residue ring
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Algorithm 4 Precomputation Phase - Normalization
[At local sites]:
for k = 1 to K do
ctk ← Enc
(
max{||xki ||2}1≤i≤nk
)
B local max
Send ctk to the server
end for
[At the cloud server]:
Generate two random numbers r1, r2
for k = 1 to K do
Compute ct′k ← (ctk + r1) · r2
end for
Send {ct′ik}1≤k≤K to the CSP
[At the CSP]:
Compute M← max{Dec(ct′ik)}1≤k≤K
Send Enc(M) to the server
[At the cloud server]:
Compute ctmax ← r−12 · Enc(M)− r1
Send ctmax to the CSP
[At the CSP]:
Compute m← Dec(ctmax) B global max
Disseminate m to each local sites
[At local sites]:
Compute xki ← xki /m
of R modulo an integer q. As mentioned in Section 2.2, the CKKS scheme adapts some Discrete
Fourier Transformation (DFT)-like algorithms to transform an (n/2)-dimensional complex vector
into an element of the cyclotomic ring. So, a plaintext vector can be encrypted into a single packed
ciphertext and one can perform operation on these plaintext values in parallel.
For the sake of optimization of the basic polynomial arithmetic, we use the Residue Number System
(RNS) variant of CKKS [34]. If taking a ciphertext modulus Q =
∏`
i=0 qi which is a product of
distinct primes, a polynomial with a large modulus Q can be represented as a tuple of polynomials
with smaller coefficients modulo qi. If needed, we raise a ciphertext modulus from Qj =
∏j
i=0 qi to
PQj for a prime number P , called the special modulus, and perform the key-switching procedure
over RPQj followed by modulus reduction back to Qj . This series of process is usually done after
homomorphic multiplication or rotation operation. We note that the RNS primes should be 1 modulo
2n to utilize an efficient Number Theoretic Transformation (NTT) algorithm.
We begin with the parameter ` which determines the largest bit-size of a fresh ciphertext modulus. As
discussed in Section 4.1, we need to set the number of levels ` to be at least ` ≥ 6 for the evaluation
of our protocol. We note that q0 is the output ciphertext modulus and the final resulting ciphertext at
iteration t represents the desired model parameters θt but is scaled by a factor of ∆. This implies that
q0 should be larger than ∆ to ensure correctness of decryption. We set the scale factor ∆ = 245 in
the light of the encoding/encryption errors of size O(n), and thus we use the RNS primes of sizes
roughly logP ≈ 55, log q0 ≈ 55, and log qi ≈ 45 for 1 ≤ i ≤ `. Therefore, we derive a lower bound
on the bit size of the largest RLWE modulus as
logPQ = logP + log q0 + ` log qi ≈ 55 + 55 + 6 · 45 = 380.
We set the secret distribution as the uniform distribution over the set of polynomials whose coefficients
are in {0,±1}. Each coefficient of an error is drawn according to the discrete Gaussian distribution
centered at zero with standard deviation σ = 3.2. We followed the recommended parameters from
the homomorphic encryption standardization (HES) workshop paper [37], and so we took the ring
dimension n = 214 to provide at least 128-bits security level of our parameters. On the other hand,
the parameters t1 and t2 are chosen to be 50-bit and 25-bit primes, respectively.
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C Experimental Settings and Results
C.1 Detailed information of the auxiliary constant c
The values of the auxiliary constant c that we used in each experiment are described in Table 2.
Table 2: Auxiliary constant c for different experimental settings.
Task The number of sites
1 2 5 10 16
Density estimation 80 80 - - -
Logistic regression 3500 3500 1000 1000 900
Survival analysis 2000 2000 800 - -
C.2 Detailed descriptions on the experiments of Bayesian logistic regression and Bayesian
survival analysis
• We applied our approach to Bayesian logistic regression model. Logistic regression is
very popular in the field of health informatics, where sensitive data are distributed across
institutions (i.e., hospitals). The logistic function of the i-th output yi ∈ {−1,+1} given
the corresponding input vector xi ∈ Rd can be modelled as follows: Pr(yi|xi,β) =
1/(1 + exp(−yiβTxi)), where β are the parameters. Given the log likelihood of logistic
regression
l(β) = −
N∑
i=1
log(1 + exp(−yiβTxi)),
the gradient at time t in a distributed setting is as follows:
l′(βt) =
K∑
k=1
(Xk)T (yk − µkt ),
where µt is an N -dimensional vector with the i-th element Pr(Y = 1|xi,βt).
The PhysioNet Challenge 2012 dataset used in this experiment is extracted from the Multi-
parameter Intelligent Monitoring in Intensive Care II database comprised of patient stays
in the intensive care unit (ICU) lasting at least 48 hours to predict mortality. We used the
dataset A consisting of 4,000 subjects whose age at ICU admission was 16 years or over.
The data were formatted as time-stamped measurements for 37 distinct variables and four
static variables. We transformed each time-series variable into min, max, mean, first value,
and last value variables as a way to summarize it. Missing values were replaced by the mean
value of a variable and the columns having all the same values were removed.
• Survival analysis is a class of statistical methods to study the time until the occurrence of a
specified event. The usual methods assume that all individuals under study are subjects to
the event the interest. Among several models for survival analysis, we focus on Exponential
distribution-based parametric survival model. Given {xi, ci, ti}Ni=1, where ci ∈ {0, 1}
is a censoring indicator whether the i-th sample is censored (0) or not (1) and ti is the
observed response for the i-th sample (i.e., ti = min(Ci, Ti) when Ci and Ti denote time
to the specified event and time to be censored respectively), the log likelihood function of
Exponential model with parameters α,β is
l(α,β) = −
N∑
i=1
(
ci(logα+ β
Txi) +
ti
α exp(βTxi)
)
,
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(a) Learning curves (b) Classification accuracies
Figure 4: Bayesian logistic regression on the PhysioNet dataset at various numbers of sites, when
 = 1.
Figure 5: Classification accuracies of Bayesian logistic regression with the different local sample
sizes.
and the gradients of α,β at iteration t are
l′(αt) =
K∑
k=1
(tk)T 1
exp (βTt X
k1) · (ck)T 1 ,
l′(βt) =
1
αt
K∑
k=1
(Xk)T tk
exp (βTt X
k1)
−
K∑
k=1
(Xk)T 1,
respectively. We conducted the experiment with α = 1 for simplicity. Original FLchain
dataset has 8 variables, but we deleted one of them, the starting year, which is actually an
unnecessary variable.
C.3 Experimental results at the various numbers of local sitesK
Additional experimental results are described when differentiating the number of local sites from
2 to 16 with the privacy budget  = 1. Here, we only conducted experiments on Bayesian logistic
regression since we have already seen that the tendency of prediction results between Bayesian
logistic regression and Bayesian survival analysis are the same. As shown in Figure 4, our approach
allows us to achieve robust prediction accuracy with no significant difference from the global model
even if the number of sites increases to 16, which is quite useful. The differences of results among
the various numbers of sites might be caused by the different choice of auxiliary constant, and the
different sample spaces; since we fixed the batch size as 320, the sample space per each site would be
reduced when the number of sites increases.
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C.4 Experimental results with different local sample sizes
To check the prediction performance of our approach when local parties have different sample sizes,
another simple experiment on 2-site distributed Bayesian logistic regression was performed with
the privacy budget from -2 to 1 in the log-scale. We divided the PhysioNet dataset into two with a
sample size ratio of four to one to simulate a scenario with the large-sized local site and small-sized
local site; the target (i.e., label) ratio and batch size remain the same with the basic experimental
setting. Figure 5 shows that our approach is not sensitive to the local sample size, which means that
our approach can be practical even in the situation with participating parties having different local
sizes, for example, a large hospital and a small hospital.
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